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 SOME IMPLICATIONS OF JURISTIC PRAGMATISM
 FOWLER VINCENT HARPER
 I
 O- NE of the disconcerting factors about the study of
 jurisprudence is the variety of meaning which the
 term conveys. All are familiar with the looseness
 with which the expression is used, and one is at once cautious
 to designate clearly the limitations with which his usage is to
 be attended. The result is that classifications have been made
 which tend to distinguish jurisprudence from broader and
 more narrow fields of legal investigation.' German writers set
 jurisprudence over against the philosophy of law, both being
 subdivisions of the "science of law," in the broad sense.2 One
 effect of such classification is to emphasize the distinctions be-
 tween jurisprudence, as the science of law in the narrow sense,
 and the philosophy of law, at the expense of recognizing the
 relation between them. It is submitted that jurisprudence, in
 this restricted sense, should be regarded as dependent upon
 philosophy of law, or, as some will have it, the philosophy of
 law as dependent upon jurisprudence.' The interrelation be-
 tween the two seems to be such that the two propositions are
 interchangeable, for each field is indispensable to the other.4
 It is true, as everyone knows, that for a long time now,
 legal philosophy has been in ill repute. This indeed is a mon-
 strous situation when the investigation of "fundamental prin-
 ciples" is thus neglected. But it may very well be because
 legal philosophy has had in many years but little to offer a
 1 Cf. Rottschafer, "Jurisprudence: Philosophy or Science," Minn. Law Rev.,
 XI (1927), 293.
 2See Gareis, Science of Law, p. i5; ibid. (IfII), p. 22, n. 3.
 3See Miraglia, Comparative Legal Philosophy (I9I2), p. 89.
 'Cf. Berolzheimer, The World's Legal Philosophies (I924), p. IO.
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 world of workingmen and working ideas. But there are signs
 of a change of front, and the interest in philosophical investi-
 gation is unquestionably increasing rapidly. The reasons for
 this are not far to seek. General philosophy is tending to re-
 strict its field to include only such philosophic propositions as
 can be investigated by means of the modern scientific method,
 by which is meant the method of observation, experiment, and
 trial hypothesis as commonly used by men of science since the
 days of Kepler and Copernicus.5
 By such a conception of the philosophy of law, there is at
 once a tendency to eliminate the speculation upon those prop-
 ositions about law which, by hypothesis, are incapable of be-
 ing proved. That this does not inordinately hamper the prov-
 ince of legal philosophy is at once clear when it is remembered
 that in many such propositions it can never be shown that
 there is, in fact, any problem to be solved.6
 Then again, by confining philosophical investigation in
 law to those propositions which may be attacked with the tem-
 per of the scientific spirit and which may be subjected to
 scientific processes, the great and constant threat to legal phi-
 losophy is at once eliminated. An entire system of juristic phi-
 losophy need not crumble into nothingness the instant that
 science and experience detect some fatal flaw in the data upon
 which it is reared. An analogy may be drawn from the effect
 upon philosophy generally of the new physics with its com-
 plete abandonment of the notion of cause, which effect has
 been so pressed upon philosophic and scientific men generally;
 or from the effect of modern astronomy upon the older notion
 G Cf. Russell, "Scientific Method in Philosophy," Logic and Mysticism and
 Other Essays (I925), P. 97.
 'Cf. Tourtoulon, Philosophy in the Development of Law (1922), pp. 26-27.
 "Two radically different reasons, however, may be given as to why a problem is in-
 soluble. One reason is that the problem is too high for intelligence; the other is that
 the question in its very asking makes assumptions that render the question meaning-
 less. The latter alternative is unerringly pointed to in the celebrated case of design
 v. chance" (Dewey, Influence of Darwin, etc., p. W4).
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 of a "universe" as opposed to a "multiverse." We are remind-
 ed by a scientific philosopher:
 In the days before Copernicus the conception of the "universe" was
 defensible on scientific grounds: the diurnal revolution of the heavenly
 bodies bound them together as all parts of one system, of which the earth
 was the center. Around this apparent scientific fact, many human de-
 sires rallied: the wish to believe Man important in the scheme of things,
 the theoretical desire for a comprehensive understanding of the whole, the
 hope that the course of nature might be guided by some sympathy with
 our wishes. In this way, an ethically inspired system of metaphysics
 grew up, whose anthropocentrism was apparently warranted by the geo-
 centrism of astronomy. When Copernicus swept away the astronomical
 basis of this system of thought, it had grown so familiar and had asso-
 ciated itself so intimately with men's aspiration, that it survived with
 scarcely diminished force-survived even Kant's "Copernican revolu-
 tion," and is still now the unconscious premise of most metaphysical
 systems.7
 This survival is nowhere better illustrated in legal phi-
 losophy than in the "universal" conception of the various phi-
 losophies of the law of nature prior to the modern distinctions
 between form and content of the neo-Kantian school. Older
 natural-law philosophies, especially those which survived in
 American law,8 represented the older philosophic concept of
 the eternally valid or universal law, a relic of medieval astron-
 omy, to which positive law must conform and by which it
 could be measured.9
 That both philosophy and science must deal with the same
 subject matter is now so generally conceded that both phi-
 losophers and scientists are beginning to recognize it.'" If,
 then, the philosophy of law be regarded as seeking to clarify
 the method of law, to rationalize its processes and to furnish
 'Russell, op. cit., p. 99.
 8See Haines, "The Law of Nature in State and Federal Judicial Decisions
 (igi6)," Yale Law Jour., XXV, 6i7; Harper, "Natural Law in Constitutional
 Theory," Mich. Law Rev., XXVI (I927), 62.
 9 Cf. Pound, Interpretations of Legal History (I923), pp. 5-6.
 10 Cf. Storek in Journal of Philosophy, XXIII (I926), 22, reviewing H. W.
 Carr, Scientific Approach to Philosophy (I924).
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 tests and criteria for the attainment of its ends so that the
 consequences of law can be subjected to the devastating fire of
 applied science, there is at once provoked a field of study
 which is capable of inquiry upon purely empirical bases, and
 one which affords a tangible subject matter.
 But whence, it may be asked, is such a philosophy of law to
 come? Must there be constructed from the whole cloth an en-
 tire new system of legal thought, or is it to spring full blown
 from the science of law? In truth, the yeast of various posi-
 tivistic philosophies has been working in the law for many
 years, manifesting itself in various forms. For a score of years,
 now, since the interest in America has been focused upon so-
 ciological jurisprudence, there have occurred not infrequent
 hints in the literature of the philosophy of law which must
 eventually emerge. Old ways of thinking, sometimes called by
 new names, at frequent intervals threaten to develop into a
 systematic philosophic program in law. And yet, though it is
 strange indeed, a pragmatist philosophy of law has failed def-
 initely to appear or to be as boldly proclaimed as might be ex-
 pected," although measureable success is accompanying ex-
 periments in some quarters.
 Pragmatism no doubt has much that is useless for law and
 doubtless for an enduring philosophy of any sort. Its theory
 of the knowledge process and James's radical empiricism seem
 to offer little help for law. There has been, no doubt, enough
 of metaphysics in modern legal speculation. Further there is no
 more need for a new method for preserving and for justifying
 the rubbish of the law than there is need for a new process of
 justifying the rubbish of religion or of ethics. But pragmatism
 with its empirical bases and its eye directed toward fruits and
 consequences can surely be retained as ground for the super-
 structure which is developing upon it.
 What has pragmatism, then, to offer that is particularly
 tempting to the law? It offers an empirical and scientific way
 "See Wu's reference to the pragmatist jurist, Ill. Law Rev., XVIII (I924),
 285? 286.
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 of thinking that is peculiarly capable of transplanting directly
 into the loam of Anglo-American law. It directs the legal phi-
 losopher to answers for his problems that fit strikingly well
 into the common-law system.
 Consider, if we may, the pragmatist thesis. "The truth of
 an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth hap-
 pens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events. Its
 verity is in fact an event, a process; the process of its verifying
 itself, its verification. Its validity is the process of its valida-
 tion."2"
 To the sociological jurist this is indeed not unfamiliar, for
 it is the bald statement of a thesis which must form the justifi-
 cation of his method. And yet the effect of such a philosophy
 boldly and deliberately applied to legal phenomena is start-
 ling. Every rule of law is just or unjust as, and according to,
 its subsequent justification. Justice becomes an attribute of
 the legal rule by way of its relation to subsequent experience.
 The justice-of the rule is, in fact, the process of its justifica-
 tion. In Judge Cardozo's phrase, "there is an endless 'becom-
 ing,""3 and it is toward this that the eye of the pragmatist
 jurist is directed.
 Thus the decision in every case is a projection into the
 future and a prophecy of the effect upon the social order of the
 conduct thus regulated. Now the "just" becomes merely the
 expedient in adapting the legal order to the social and eco-
 nomic structure. The legal rule enunciated in a decision be-
 comes but a "working hypothesis" which will be demonstrat-
 ed, experientially, to be sound or unsound. The rule will be
 just or unjust as its consequences reveal."4 As law for Justice
 Holmes means prophecies of what the court will do; so, just
 law for the pragmatist jurist means prophecies of what will
 " James, Pragmatism (I914), p. 20I; Preface, Meaning of Truth (i9ii), p. vi.
 8 Nature of the Judicial Process (I922), lp. 28.
 14 Cf. More, Ethics, chap. v. The "consequences," however, include the present
 as well as the future. Cf. Tufts, Creative Intelligence, p. 384.
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 produce the most satisfactory and most desired consequences,
 in the main and on the whole view.
 The pragmatist tool is logic, but logic of an experimental
 type as the only kind consistent with the pragmatist view-
 point. By this logic there is substituted, in Professor Dewey's
 words,"5 "the method of search and discovery" for the old syl-
 logistic process. The logic that lends consistence and systema-
 tization to the law is not abandoned, but it is made purely "in-
 strumental" rather than an end in and for itself.16 Thus the
 instrumental view of logic is founded in and may be said to be
 a part of the pragmatic process. A pragmatist philosophy of
 law will be the theory of the synthetic process of coordinating
 the legal materials with desire, with experimental logic as its
 working tool.
 Law, from this standpoint, becomes a part of the general
 scheme of instruments for readaptation. It but assists society
 in its experiments of readjustment. Every application of a
 rule of law is a prophecy, good or bad, as to conditions neces-
 sary to make the future satisfactory. It thus requires in every
 case, verification-in the strict legal sense, justification. The
 whole genius of the pragmatic attitude is that it has no theory
 of reality, and in law it will have no unprovable presupposi-
 tions about abstract justice. It has been called an "emanci-
 pated empiricism" and is content, says Dewey, to "take its
 stand with science. l7
 It has been said that law is not like the physical sciences in
 that its subject matter is a physical phenomenon to be ac-
 counted for by a theory worked out by observation of facts,18
 but nevertheless the consequences of the social phenomena
 which constitute the subject matter of law are capable of ob-
 servation, and' legal hypotheses can be tested by experience
 " "Logical Theory in Law," Corn. Law Quart., X (I925), I7, 2I.
 "0Ibid., p. i9. 17 Creative Intelligence (i9i7), p. 55.
 "8Pound, "Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence," Harv. Law Rev.,
 XXV (I9q2), 598.
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 and validated or invalidated. Physical science formerly ac-
 cepted as its fundamental premises a priori assumptions which
 were regarded as self-evident, and the revolutionary character
 of the modern scientific method must be ascribed to its elim-
 ination of such a priori categories and its concentration upon
 the consequences of hypotheses." Scientific philosophizing,
 accordingly, formulates as explanations of these hypotheses
 nothing but certain "empirical generalizations," which can
 themselves be modified from time to time when the working
 hypotheses are corrected by the consequences in experience
 which follow.
 From unexpected sources there come indications of the
 attitude of the pragmatist in the philosophy of law. Especial-
 ly is this true where the sociological school has made headway.
 In America, the most brilliant exponent of sociological juris-
 prudence has been pronounced "a thoroughgoing pragma-
 tist."20 Vander Eycken finds that " it is no longer in texts or in
 systems derived from reason that we must look for the source
 of law; it is in social utility, in the necessity that certain con-
 sequences shall be attached to given hypotheses."2
 The movement on the Continent for "free judicial deci-
 sion" has behind it, in some quarters at least, a juristic prag-
 matism. In Germany, where the transcendental philosophies
 of the neo-Hegelian and neo-Kantian schools are strong, this
 is not so noticeable, but in Geny we find significant indications
 of a philosophy which is, in method, not inconsistent with
 science. He says:
 Now it cannot be repeated too often that legal science is essentially a
 science of action, having no purpose except that of finding the necessary
 rules for the government of certain human relations by external social
 sanctions. It is based on facts of social life which it aims to order and
 19 Cohen, "Place of Logical Theory in Law," ibid., XXIX (i9i6), 622, 63I-32.
 20 See Wu, op. cit., XVIII, 285, 297.
 ' Mithode positive de l'Interpretation juridique, p. 401, quoted by Judge Car-
 dozo, Nature of the Judicial Process, pp. I2I-22.
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 arrange in such a way that the consequences flowing from them are those
 which are socially desirable.22
 The connection between sociological jurisprudence and
 juristic pragmatism is tot difficult to understand. Sociological
 jurisprudence demands a pragmatist philosophy of law-in
 fact, it presupposes it. Dean Pound has pointed out, in his
 critique of sociological jurisprudence, five characteristics of
 the sociological jurist,23 every one of which is teleological, in
 the broad sense, namely, by assuming a system wherein pur-
 poses are realized within wider or more narrow limits. The
 necessity for a pragmatist attitude in philosophy is consistent
 with none but the teleological method in science.24
 Sociological jurisprudence has pointed law toward social
 justice and has assumed that law must seek to attain certain
 ends. What it needs is (i) a philosophy which will explain its
 method and furnish it with a rationale; and (2) one which
 will provide the sociological jurist with tools and show him
 how to use them by (3) furnishing him with some scale of
 values by which he can hew his way through the experiential
 flux of the legal order.
 Jhering's great thesis, as everyone knows, provides a meth-
 od which in its bare form but puts off the ultimate problem.25
 22 "Judicial Freedom of Decision," Science of Legal Method (I9I2), p. i6.
 23 "Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence," Harv. Law Rev., XXV
 (19I2), 489, 5I2-i6.
 ' Cf. Dewey, "Philosophic Method," Experience and Nature (I925), p. 37.
 "The purport of thinking, scientific and philosophic, is not to eliminate choice but
 to render it less arbitrary, and more significant. It loses its arbitrary character when
 its quality and consequences are such as to commend themselves to the reflection of
 others after they have betaken themselves to the situations indicated; it becomes
 significant when reason for the choice is found to be weighty, and its consequences
 momentous. This statement is not a commendation of the will to believe. It is not
 a statement that we should choose, or that some choices are self-justifying. It is a
 statement that wherever reflection occurs and intelligence operates, a selective dis-
 crimination does occur. The justification of a choice is wholly another matter; it is
 extrinsic. It depends upon the extent in which observation, memory and forethought
 have entered into making the choice, and upon the consequences that flow from it.
 When choice is avowed, others can repeat the course of the experience; it is an ex-
 periment to be tried, not an automatic safety device."
 2 Cf. Geny, O0. cit., pp. I3-I4.
This content downloaded from 156.56.168.2 on Thu, 26 May 2016 19:40:31 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 IMPLICATIONS OF JURISTIC PRAGMATISM 277
 Sociological jurisprudence, in its more developed form, while
 it lends direction to, yet does not completely fix, the empirical
 limits of the juristic process. There is still wanting a systemat-
 ic philosophy of law. Sociological jurisprudence is a method
 in the science of law, while juristic pragmatism is a scientific
 method in the philosophy of law. Experimental logic is the
 actual juristic tool with which the work is performed. As aux-
 iliary equipment, for purposes of testing hypotheses through
 examinations into their consequences, there must be legal so-
 ciology, legal economics, and the behavioristic ethics which is
 in the process of formulation. Thus the functional study of
 law extends the juristic process and furnishes means by which
 recurring checks can be made. As Dean Pound predicted,
 some years ago, "the sociological movement in jurisprudence
 is a movement for pragmatism as a philosophy of law .
 for putting the human factor in the central place and relegat-
 ing logic to its true position as an instrument.""
 But if the sociological movement presupposes a pragmatist
 philosophy in law, it does so no more than other characteris-
 tics of American legal thought. Pragmatism has been regard-
 ed as peculiarly American and particularly adapted to the
 culture of a people of our experience. It is not inconsistent
 with the spirit and methods of the common law. Judge Car-
 dozo has declared that "the juristic philosophy of the common
 law is at bottom the philosophy of pragmatism,"27 and Dean
 Pound has described the process which only juristic pragma-
 tism can explain as one of the "purely juristic methods of
 systematizing the judicial finding of law." He continues:
 This method, in appearance crude and unscientific, is none the less
 justified by its results. It is, in truth, the method of the natural scientist,
 of the physician and of the engineer, the method of trial hypothesis and
 confirmation. The tentative results of a priori reasoning are corrected
 continually by experience. A cautious advance is made at some point. If
 just results follow, the advance goes forward and in time a rule is devel-
 26"Mechanical Jurisprudence," Colo. Law Rev., VIII (igo8), 605, 609-i0.
 2"Nature of the Judicial Process (I922 ), p. I02.
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 oped. If the results are not just, a new line is taken, and so on until the
 best line is discovered.28
 There are still other reasons to expect the seeds of prag-
 matism to flourish in American law. Continental critics of the
 neo-Hegelian fold have criticized sociological jurisprudence
 and the entire doctrine of "interests." Berolzheimer says:
 Just as well, or just as ill, as on the basis of the "justice based on
 needs or interests" might cases be decided by the throw of the dice. The
 "justice based on needs or interests," which in the last analysis may be
 reduced to Jherin'g's utilitarian theory, offers an erroneous standard for
 the weighing of the unweighable. Moreover, it puts profit and advantage
 in the place of right and justice, so that the function of doing justice
 would be degraded to a mere act of administration.29
 But that which here offends this pretentious conception of
 "justice," which presumably may not always be one with
 "profit and advantage," is by no means so outrageous to the
 Anglo-American legal philosopher. The notion of justice which
 approves and fosters the widespread tendency toward admin-
 istrative justice and individualized application of law is not
 only consistent with the thesis of juristic pragmatism but is re-
 inforced by such a philosophy. "Administration," declares
 Pound, "has thus far proved the most effective agency of ad-
 ministrative justice. Thus we may understand the growth of
 administrative justice which has gone forward so rapidly in
 the last twenty-five years. Administration had little place in
 the pioneer, rural, agricultural society of the last century. It
 belongs to a busy age.""3 The conditions which the American
 scene affords and which have produced administrative ma-
 chinery and the sociological method in juristic science demand
 likewise a philosophy which is akin to nothing more than to
 juristic pragmatism.
 2 "Courts and Legislation," Science of Legal Method, p. 214; cf. Cardozo,
 op. cit., p. 23; cf. Pound, "Theory of Judicial Decision," Harv. Law Rev., XXXVI
 (I923), 940, 953.
 2 "Perils of Emotionalism," Science of Legal Method, p. I72.
 30 "Law and Social Work," Ind. Law Jour., III ( I927), i83, i89.
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 And thus we are brought to realize that not only does
 juristic pragmatism sanction the teleological method in sci-
 ence, but that it is in complete accord with the evolutionary
 conception of law.3' But herein, again, is there a radical dif-
 ference between the orthodox historical jurist or the neo-
 Hegelian type and the pragmatist philosopher. It is evolution
 of a different sort. The older evolutionist will disprove, to his
 entire satisfaction, the entire utilitarian doctrine by showing
 how "each substantial and fundamental change in the law has
 been the result of a struggle and the victory of one part of the
 community over the other-a struggle, to be sure, under the
 banner of a more modem and advanced idea of justice, and a
 victory of law purified over a stagnating condition that had
 come to be felt as unjust."32
 The deterministic attitude here finds expression in the no-
 tion of law as something found, rather than made;33 some-
 thing to be studied rather than controlled and directed. A
 pantheistic universe has swallowed up law, leaving nothing
 but the marks of history.34 The kind of evolution character-
 istic of juristic pragmatism, however, is more modern, and in-
 deed more radical. In the first place, it is free from the presup-
 position of the old-fashioned evolutionist philosophy which
 assumes, on strict biological analogy, that all change is for the
 better.3" It will not deny that the "unfolding of the idea of
 liberty" might very conceivably amount to deprivation of
 both individual and social freedom. In other words, it is not
 31Dewey, Influence of Darwin, etc. (i9io), pp. 8-9.
 82 Berolzheimer, "Perils of Emotionalism," op. cit., p. 17I.
 33 Pound, Law and Morals (I922), p. i6; Interpretations of Legal History
 (I923), p. i6; "Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence," Harv. Law Rev.,
 XXIV (191I), 59I, 599.
 Cf. Tourtoulon, op. cit., p. 61I7.
 88 Cf. Russell, Mysticism and Logic, pp. 22 ff.; Russell, "Scientific Method in
 Philosophy," op. cit., p. I05; cf. Cohen, Editorial Preface to Tourtoulon, Philosophy
 in the Development of Law, pp. xxv-xxvi; cf. Tourtoulon's discussion of "Progres-
 sive Evolution," ibid., pp. 603 ff.
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 forced to assume that the natural order of things is growth
 rather than deterioration; progress rather than retrogression."6
 Now juristic pragmatism maintains that there is nothing
 inconsistent between a teleological system and a deterministic
 system."7 The historical view is mechanical, not as opposed to
 organic but as opposed to volitional, and determinism is un-
 derstood as mechanical determinism. For the pragmatist jurist
 there is no contradiction in maintaining that the law is both
 teleological and deterministic because the determinants are
 not necessarily posited in a system of mechanical causation.
 Bertrand Russell will insist that it may be teleological and, at
 the same time, mechanically determined,38 although we are
 not to accept Russell's conception of pragmatism nor yet con-
 cede the logical positions into which he argues it."9
 Another important contribution which juristic pragmatism
 offers is the method of finding some scale for supplying the cri-
 teria for judgment. "Value-standards," as they have been
 called,40 are one of the most immediate demands upon the
 theory of law.
 Here it is that the instrumental aspect of judgment is im-
 portant. Since the scientist's ideas are "working hypotheses"
 and have value as they enable him to predict and to control,
 his ideas are the instruments for directing experience, by con-
 structing anticipations and conditions appropriate to their
 realization. The test of the truth of his idea is in the carrying
 from anticipation to realization. So, as applied to law as a test
 of justice, the "workability" of the rule to resolve the difficul-
 ty which created the problem in the first place will furnish the
 Consequently, we get the conception of responsibility. Cf. Dewey, op. cit.,
 p. i7: "but if insight into specific conditions of value and into specific consequences
 of ideas is possible, philosophy must in time become a method of locating and inter-
 preting the more serious of the conflicts that occur in life, and a method of pro-
 jecting ways for dealing with them; a method of moral and political diagnosis and
 prognosis."
 'T Cf. Russell, "On the Notion of Cause," op. Cit., pp. 201 if.
 "Ibid., p. 208. "Ibid., p. 203.
 See Rottschafer, "Jurisprudence: Philosophy or Science," Minn. Law Rev.,
 XI, 293, 298 if.
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 only test possible and the only one necessary. Beyond this,
 nothing can be demanded of the law. "Hence judgment arises
 in the self-conscious realization of a problem. When
 the difficulty has been apprehended, the judgment emerges as
 the consciousness of the conditions which will attain the de-
 sired end of action freed and unimpaired."'"
 Just as truth for the pragmatist becomes a class name for
 all sorts of working values in experience,4 so justice for the
 pragmatist jurist becomes a class name for all sorts of definite
 working values in legal experience. And as economics long ago
 gave up the notion of an absolute or real value and recognized
 that it is want only which makes value, so the juristic prag-
 matist looks for no value except that which is raised by social
 and human need. This yields a conception of justice which is
 organic and synthetic and one which is in constant process of
 reconstruction.4" Values vary directly with wants, and since it
 is want that is to be measured rather than value in any other
 sense, the problem is not insurmountable, for sciences other
 than law are developing pragmatic tools for estimating the
 intensity of social needs.
 II
 So, since "it is the business of legal science to teach the law
 as it actually works,"44 the construction of a scientific philoso-
 4 S. F. McLennan, "Typical Stages in the Development of Judgment," Studies
 in Logical Theory (1903), pp. 128, I37.
 42 James, Pragmatism, p. 68.
 "Intelligence and reason imply (a) considering the proposed act or the actu-
 ally performed act as a whole and in its relations. Especially they mean considering
 consequences. In order to foresee consequences there is required not only empirical
 observation of past experience, not only deduction from already formulated con-
 cepts-as when we say that injustice will cause hard feelings and revolt-but that
 rarer quality which in the presence of a situation discerns a meaning not obvious,
 suggests an idea, 'injustice,' to interpret the situation. Situations are neither already
 labeled 'unjust,' nor are they obviously unjust to the ordinary mind. Analysis into
 elements and rearrangement of the elements into a new synthesis are required. This
 is eminently a synthetic or 'creative' activity" (James H. Tufts, "The Moral Life
 and the Construction of Values and Standards," Creative Intelligence, Ppp 354,
 363-64).
 4 Ehrlich, "Judicial Freedom of Decision," Science of Legal Method, p. 77.
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 phy of law may well be the logical task of those interested in
 such fields of thought. That there is a need for such a philoso-
 phy cannot more unhappily be illustrated than by the pro-
 nouncement of an American judge that in the common law
 "there are no working hypotheses."45
 The materials for such a philosophy should be ready and
 waiting in the actual workings of the law. If the method ac-
 tually employed in legal science is one that presupposes an ex-
 perimental philosophy, that method in operation should be ex-
 pected to reveal the sources for such material. We need not be
 reminded by Wurzel that the method betrays at once the point
 of view from which one approaches a subject and will deter-
 mine different results accordingly.46 Since the sociological
 method is one that is consciously developed by legal science,
 and since it is consistent with the pragmatic view, we may ex-
 pect best results from an investigation of opinions which re-
 veal the sociological jurist deliberately pursuing his science,
 although in view of the empiricism which the common-law
 system has developed, the attitude of the juristic pragmatist
 is not deeply latent beneath the entire process.
 In considering the complete process of judicial reasoning,
 it seems obvious that legal science has a unique function to
 perform. It must establish certain hypotheses from the avail-
 able legal materials from which the decision in the instant case
 can be developed, and it must anticipate consequences which
 will justify and explain the decision when it is reached. But it
 has been pointed out by Professor Dewey that, as a matter of
 fact, the conclusion does not follow from the so-called "prem-
 ises," that the premises and the conclusion are two ways of
 stating the same thing. The development of the premises and
 the development of the conclusion are one and the same opera-
 tion.47 It appears in the form of the "giving of reasons" in the
 "R. L. Fowler, "The New Philosophies of Law," Harv. Law Rev., XXVII
 (I914), 7i8, 72I.
 ' "Juridical Thinking," Science of Legal Method, p. 295, n. 13.
 4TDewey, "Logical Theory in Law," Corn. Law Quart., X (I925), 17, 23.
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 opinion of the court. Surely if the court in its opinion is pur-
 porting to represent the logical steps through which the judi-
 cial mind actually passes in working out the problem, it is
 fooling no one so much as itself. The entire opinion merely
 sets forth the hypothesis which is involved over and over again
 in different forms. Logic has been described as the "deriva-
 tion of a consequence from a rule or a principle or a precedent
 which, accepted as a datum, contains implicitly within itself
 the germ of the conclusion."48 What is really important is that
 we recognize that here a datum of legal experience occurs by
 refining hypotheses constructed from the legal experience at
 hand, which themselves anticipate an explanation of that de-
 veloped datum.
 The philosophy of law, if it is to perform its task, must
 now develop "empirical generalizations" from which the hy-
 potheses which the court has set up may proceed as conclu-
 sions. While this is the part of the entire process that is con-
 cealed to a greater or less extent, it is here that the ends of
 law are postulated and that the secret of the method is to be
 found. Now in so far as pragmatism constructs a thesis which
 demands a teleological method, it to that extent points laws
 toward the consequences and demands a technique which the
 sociological jurist has supplied. Without a juristic pragma-
 tism, however, sociological jurisprudence lacks a rationale and
 is entirely without a sound philosophical basis.
 But philosophy must do more, and pragmatism does more.
 It must provide some standard whereby to test the decision
 once it emerges. Hence the decision rendered is but another
 hypothesis just as those from which it is developed. It is an
 attempt to control future experience. It is a prophecy of what
 conditions will produce the realization from the present antici-
 pation. It is to be tested, proved, and justified by its conse-
 quences. If it "works," it will be just; if its working value is
 high, it will to that extent be verified.
 ' Cardozo, op. cit., p. 49.
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 Thus it is seen that just as an experimental logic regards
 the premises of its processes as but working hypotheses, so a
 juristic pragmatism regards the rule of law enunciated in the
 decision arrived at as a mere working hypothesis, to be tested
 by subsequent experience, as sociology, ethics, and the allied
 sciences shall reveal it.
 In this entire process, there is seen the inseparability and
 interdependence of the science of law and the philosophy of
 law,49 and the necessity for a consistent theory in both. Both
 demand, moreover, tools which will assist the jurist to arrive
 at the postulated ends and pursue the prescribed method. Not
 the least essential to the satisfactory working of the system is
 the aid of extra-jurisprudential disciplines in checking up on
 results and measuring the reasons therefor.
 By this conception it is seen that the philosophy of law is
 nothing more than a process. Philosophy and science consti-
 tute one co-ordinated system of thought, science being sub-
 ordinate to philosophy in the logical scheme, but inevitably
 linked to it. Legal philosophy now proceeds upon no presup-
 positions whatever except the principles of logic which are not
 substantive presuppositions at all, but merely such as pertain
 to the method, not only of philosophy but of all science.
 Now the philosophy of law seeks to determine the ends of
 law and to direct science to the attainment of them. There-
 after it provides for tests for the hypotheses, supplied by the
 applied sciences. It will be recalled how the analytical method
 has ever revealed a philosophy of presuppositions of a fatal
 kind. The procedural presuppositions of the principles of logic
 assume a substantive form in the syllogism. This has ever
 been the limitation of the analytical jurist. His method is good
 so far as it goes, but when it becomes a philosophic system
 which depends upon the absoluteness of the content of the
 logical conceptions, it ceases to be serviceable.
 4 Cf. Wu, "The Juristic Philosophy of Roscoe Pound," Ill. Law Rev., XVIII,
 285, 287.
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 Sociological jurisprudence, however, calls for and must re-
 veal a different philosophy, for in so far as the process of form-
 ulating the ends of law is concerned, the "empirical general-
 izations" from which the hypothesis proceeds are conditioned
 upon a valid method of determining social needs. Thus when
 corrections are made upon the hypotheses, where, by compe-
 tent investigations of a functional nature, the consequences
 reveal errors in the application of juristic science, there is no
 invalidation of the philosophy of law. Wherever, then, in an
 actual opinion, the sociological method is discovered, there
 should be behind the process a philosophy of juristic pragma-
 tism whether the basic principles are articulate in the opinion
 or not.
 Thus an examination of judicial decisions which have
 made possible the great flood of social legislation within the
 past three-score years, completely revolutionizing the legal
 conception of "due process of law," proceed from a deep-root-
 ed pragmatist thinking. Hours of labor laws which had for-
 merly outraged the liberty of contract dogma have been found
 to "work" better than the older hypothesis.5" Statutes alleviat-
 ing conditions of employment, while formerly regarded as "in-
 sulting" to the American workingman,5" have higher working
 values than decisions which emanated from natural law but
 left the laborer "free to starve."" Freedom of silence guaran-
 teed by "natural right"" is abandoned when service-letter
 statutes for employees remove an evil which sociological and
 economic science lays bare as all too real.54 Sterilization laws
 "0Dominion Hotel v. Arizona, I7 Ariz. 267, I5I Pac. 958 (I9I5); State v. Col-
 lins, 47 S.D. 325, i98 N.W. 557 (I923). See Harper, "Due Process of Law in State
 Labor Legislation," Mich. Law Rev., XXVI (I923), 599.
 6' See Godsharles v. Wigeman, II3 Pa. St. 43I, 437, 6 Alt. 354 (i886).
 6 Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, I83 U.S. I3, 46 L.Ed. 55, 22 SUp. Ct. I
 (I90)).
 " See St. Louis S.W.R.R. v. Griffin, I06 Text 477, I7I S.W. 703 (1914).
 "Prudential Insurance Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 66 L.Ed. I044, 42 Sup. Ct.
 5I6 (I922).
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 become constitutional when it is demonstrated that society
 sustains wrongs which are great in comparison with the per-
 sonal inconvenience which attends a simple operation,55 and
 zoning ordinances are valid when the social standard of aes-
 thetics demands a more workable rule than the old individual-
 ist philosophy of the common law could afford.56
 The common law, too, affords constant evidences of the
 juristic pragmatism which alone can solve its philosophic
 problems. A modern commentator on the law of negligence
 has called to mind two decisions involving the violation of a
 statute by plaintiff, as a defense. The Vermont court found it
 good, because the plaintiff was doing an act which was forbid-
 den, and the law consequently imposed no duty upon the de-
 fendant to exercise care toward him to protect him from
 danger.57 The Wisconsin court, however, found that plaintiff's
 violation of the statute had nothing to do with the injury, and
 consequently it was no defense in an action for negligence.58
 As some will have it, the decision turned on the proposition
 that the statute was not designed to relieve the defendant
 from his wrong.59 In any event both decisions were logical
 enough and both, perhaps, sound. The writer says:
 The question was one of sound policy, and the Wisconsin court took
 one view while the Vermont court took the other. Which was right?
 There is no right and wrong in such cases. It is a matter of judgment,
 good taste, an interpretation of the community's desires; in short, law
 making; at least the bounding of the scope of the protection afforded by
 the rule of law in question.60
 Thus when jurists talk of judicial decision, not in terms of
 a logically determined system or a historical determined phe-
 " See Justice Holmes in Buck v. Bell, 47 Sup. Ct. 584 (I927).
 "See Baker, "Constitutionality of Zoning Ordinances," Ill. Law Rev., XX
 (I925), 2I3.
 TlJohnson v. Irasburgh, 47 Vt. 28 (i874).
 r"8Sutton v. Wauwatose, 29 Wis. 2I (i87i).
 9 Green, "Contributory Negligence and Proximate Cause," N.C. Law Rev., VI
 (I927), I, I4-I5.
 60Ibid., p. 15.
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 nomenon, but in terms of "judgment," "good taste," and "in-
 terpretation of the community's desire," they are talking in
 terms of working hypotheses, offensive to any form of natural
 law. Courts are almost consciously talking juristic pragma-
 tism when they reject hypotheses on the grounds that "prece-
 dents drawn from the days of travel by stage coach do not fit
 the conditions of travel today. The principle . . . . does not
 change, but the things subject to the principle do change.
 They are whatever life in a developing civilization requires
 them to be.""6
 And so, if there is anything characteristic about juristic
 pragmatism it is that it seeks to bring the law in accord with
 life and with reality. Contrary to some impressions that prag-
 matism, by reason of its empirical nature, is concerned only
 with dead facts,62 juristic pragmatism must project its legal
 hypotheses into the future and have, at all times, one eye
 pointed in the direction of future experience. Rules of law are
 only tentative. They do not have, strictly speaking, the qual-
 ity of justice. It is not a case of "right" or "wrong," but of the
 most workable regulation of conduct. Thus allowance is made
 for life and its vicissitudes. Law will not necessarily be logi-
 cal, for life is illogical. "The moulds expand and shrink."63
 At all times, the law must attempt to look ahead, and it is this
 foresight which will make for progress in law, and it is the ca-
 pacity and equipment to make intelligent corrections and
 modifications that will make the law tolerable and useful to
 society.64
 "Judge Cardozo in MacPherson v. Buick Co., 2i7 N.Y. 382, III N.E. I050
 (i9i6).
 82 Cf. Kocourek, Introduction to Berolzheimer, The World's Legal Philosophies
 (I924), p. xx.
 "3Judge Cardozo in Glsnzier v. Shepherd, 233 N. Y. 236, I35 N.E. 275 (1922).
 84 A well-settled doctrine of equity provides it a defense against a bill for
 specific performance to show that plaintiff had had knowledge of material facts, ob-
 tained through superior instruments and facilities of information, which he failed to
 disclose and which, although not amounting to actual fraud so as to support a re-
 cision, yet results in such a hard bargain that its enforcement would be inequitable
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 Often a court, following the common-law tradition of in-
 dividualism, will purport to turn its decision on grounds
 reached by a specious legalism, and lip service to dogmas,
 when, in fact, the real reasons are those explained by juristic
 pragmatism-looking to the fruits and consequences by a
 projection into future experience. Thus a court in "balancing
 the equities" of litigants may argue that "in a case of con-
 flicting rights, where neither party can enjoy his own without
 in some measure restricting the liberty of the other in the use
 of property, the law must make the best arrangement it can
 between the contending parties, with a view to preserving to
 each one the largest measure of liberty possible under the cir-
 cumstances."65 In truth, however, the secret is out when the
 same court puts the problem in other terms: "Shall the com-
 plainants be granted, in the way of damages, the full measure
 of relief to which their injuries entitle them, or shall we go
 further, and grant their request to blot out two great mining
 and manufacturing enterprises, destroy half of the taxable
 values of a county, and drive more than io,ooo people from
 their homes?""
 Again, in refusing an injunction to prevent a tannery from
 polluting a stream which if issued would impair or conclude
 (Banaghan v. Malaney, 200 Mass. 46, 85 N.E. 839 [igo8]). A different situation is
 presented, however, when it appears that plaintiff's means of information were, in
 truth, no better if not inferior to defendant's, and plaintiff had no reason to suspect
 that defendant had not the same information as he. Here there is no reprehensible
 conduct on plaintiff's part which could be construed as moral culpability. Yet he
 cannot have specific performance (Cowan v. Sapp, 8i Ala. 525, 8 So. 2I2). (The
 rule is different, however, in England. Turner v. Green, 2 Ch. 205 [i8g5]; see dis-
 cussion of the two cases in Pomeroy, Sec. 2206, n. 94.)
 Here the court has not been concerned to base its decision upon the dogma of
 clean hands. It has gone farther, and looked to the facts and the consequences, find-
 ing the bargain, quite as hard whether plaintiff has been morally culpable or not.
 The economics of the cases are the same. By looking to the consequences, both in
 the immediate situation and in the future, the result has been determined in con-
 formity with the desirability and social utility of those probable consequences.
 "5Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., II3 Tenn. 33i, 83 S.W.
 658, 667, cited in Cook's Cases on Equity (Abr.) (I904), p. 365.
 "8Ibid., 83 S.W. 658, 666.
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 operation of the industry, the court did not "feel justified in
 decreeing the issuance of an injunction, the consequences of
 which would amount to nothing less than a public calamity."67
 Already reference had been made to an injunction against a
 paper mill which had caused it to be shut down for five years.68
 And so juristic pragmatism may be at the bottom of much
 discarding of hypotheses which have proved unworkable and
 hence unjust. Little is heard in modern law of fraud about
 caveat emptor;69 fine distinctions between "affirmations" and
 "warranties" have ceased to be important in the law of sales; 70
 constant tendencies in the law of torts and credit transactions
 to distribute loss where it can most easily be carried will read-
 ily occur;71 more socially workable principles will be injected
 6" Driscoll v. American Hide & Leather Co., I02 Misc. 612, I70 N.Y.S. I2I
 (igi8), cited in Cook, op. cit., p. 353, n. I.
 68 Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 208 N.Y. i, ioi N.E. 805, cited in ibid.
 (1913), p. 351. Can the attitude of the pragmatist jurist be more forcefully pre-
 sented than in the principles which underlie the whole course of the development of
 equity jurisdiction? "The absence of precedents or novelty in incidence presents no
 obstacle to the exercise of the jurisdiction of a court of equity ... . Chancellor
 Cottinham in Wallworth v. Holt, 4 Myl. & C. 6ig, says: 'I think it the duty of this
 court (meaning equity) to adapt its practice and course of proceeding to the exist-
 ing state of society, and not by too strict an adherence to forms and rules, estab-
 lished under different circumstances, to decline to administer justice, and enforce
 rights for which there is no other remedy.' Paraphrasing the language of Justice
 Herrick in Green Island Ice Co. v. Nortont, IO App. Div. 33i, 86 N.Y.S. 613, 94
 N.Y.S. 1147, the jurisdiction of Equity is constantly growing and expanding, and
 relief is now granted in cases where formerly the courts would not have thought for
 a moment of so doing. From time immemorial it has been the rule not to grant
 equitable relief where a party praying for it had an adequate remedy at law; but
 modern ideas of what are adequate remedies are changing and expanding, and it is
 gradually coming to be understood that a system of law which will not prevent the
 doing of a wrong, but only affords redress after the wrong is committed, is not a
 complete system and is inadequate to the present needs of society" (Judge Dill in
 Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 72 N.J.Eq. 9io, 67 Atl. 97, cited in Cook, op. cit. [i907],
 p. 283).
 " Cf. Feezer, "Social Justice in Field of Torts," Minn. Law Rev., XI, 313,
 317 if.
 70 Cf. Chandelor v. Lopus, Croke Jac. 4, in Williston, Cases on Sales (i625),
 p. 668, with Un. Sales Act, Sec. 12.
 71 McPherson v. Buick Co., cited supra.
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 into the law of defamation;72 and the law of evidence will pro-
 vide hypotheses to produce a greater consistency between
 their consequences and actual experience.73
 If a philosophy of juristic pragmatism is worth anything,
 it will be because it provides legal patterns of thought which
 are calculated to lay emphasis upon juridical facts and upon
 social facts; it looks to the first for the hypotheses of the legal
 order, to the latter for their consequences. It thus confines law
 to the realities of life and should clear the way for a greater
 perfection of the sociological method, and, at the same time,
 lend symmetry and clarity to the legal system.
 UNIVERSITY OF OREGON
 ' Even without express statutory authority (Hutchins v. Page, 75 N.H. 215,
 72 AtI. 689 [igog]).
 " Cf. E. A. Harper, arguing for the application of rules of evidence that will
 produce "a desirable result and one not inconsistent with the reason underlying the
 rule itself" ("Admissibility of Declarations of Corporate Agents," Univ. of Pa. Law
 Rev., LXXVI [1927], I, i8).
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